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Market Report
Yr
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 8/1/97
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt.. . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Omaha, cwt.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Omaha, hd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fresh Pork Loins, Wholesale, 14-18 lb
  Cent. US, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$62.00
*
92.39
62.05
*
124.00
96.00
185.00 
$64.13
86.50
94.81
60.94
*
115.80
79.63
160.00 
$65.69
87.68
100.18
56.30
*
121.70
86.38
160.00 
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Chicago, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.85
4.56
7.73
6.68
* 
3.25
2.30
7.27
4.02
* 
3.72
2.53
7.60
4.36
* 
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . .
*
77.50
65.00 
*
82.00
70.00 
*
85.00
75.00 
* No market.
Agricultural markets depend considerably less
on open market transactions than 40 years ago. Increas-
ingly, the  production and marketing of agricultural
products have been coordinated by forward contracting,
production and marketing contracts, and vertical
integration. The degree to which these alternative
marketing mechanisms have been employed varies
across commodities and products. Production contracts,
marketing contracts, and vertical integration dominate
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in several livestock markets, including broilers, turkeys,
eggs and milk, and in most specialty crop markets,
including fruits, vegetables and sugar beets.  Market
transactions have continued to be more important for
field crops and the cattle and hog markets although
contract production and marketing of livestock, particu-
larly sheep, lambs and hogs, have increased during the
late 1980s and the 1990s.
Economists have sought to explain and predict
the choice of organizational forms used to coordinate
the production and marketing of various products.  Two
areas of economics that are concerned with the choice
of organizational form are transaction cost analysis,
which considers the frequency of transactions, uncer-
tainty, and asset specificity, and agency theory, which
emphasizes individual incentives and measurement
problems.
Recently, Professor Joseph T. Mahoney of the
University of Illinois developed an approach for analyz-
ing organizational form that combines aspects of both
transaction cost analysis and agency theory.  Table 1
presents the essential elements of Mahoney's frame-
Table 1.  Predicted Organizational Form
Low Task Programmability High Task Programmability
Low Specificity High Specificity Low Specificity High Specificity
Low Nonseparability 1.  Spot market 2.  Long-term contract 5.  Spot market 6.  Joint venture
High Nonseparability 3.  Relational contract 4.  Clan (hierarchy) 7.  Inside contract 8.  Hierarchy
Source:  Joseph T. Mahoney, “The Choice of Organizational Form:  Vertical Financial Ownership versus Other Methods of Vertical 
Integration,” Strategic Management Journal, 13 (1992), p. 576.
work, which is based on empirical evidence from
research in the fields of industrial organization and
strategic management.
Mahoney focuses on asset specificity,
nonseparability, and task programmability in analyzing
the choice of organizational structure.  Asset specificity
refers to the specialization of assets. Generally, the
value of highly specialized assets diminishes when they
are shifted to alternative uses.  Therefore, large invest-
ments in specialized assets increase the potential loss
from an unexpected market outcome and encourage
internal coordination of production and marketing. 
Nonseparability concerns the problem of determining
and rewarding individual effort in team production. If
rewards cannot be based on output (i.e., output is
nonseparable), a manager is required to monitor behav-
ior or effort.  Task programmability relates to the
ability to measure inputs in a production process.  Low
task programmability reduces the effectiveness of
management monitoring efforts and increases the
likelihood of ownership integration.
Table 1 consists of eight possible combinations
of asset specificity, nonseparability and task program-
mability.  When the output of an individual is easily
measured (low nonseparability) and asset specificity is
low, task programmability is inconsequential.  In both
cases (1 and 5), open market transactions (spot markets)
should serve as an effective coordinating device.
When there is low nonseparability and high
asset specificity (cases 2 and 6), a long-term relation-
ship is necessary for parties to invest in highly special-
ized assets.  The type of relationship will be influenced
by the ability to measure input behavior.  If task pro-
grammability is high, a joint venture is an effective
organizational form.  If task programmability is low, a
long-term contract that specifies output performance
and is enforced by courts is the predicted organizational
choice.
A long-term relationship is unnecessary when
there is high nonseparability and low asset specificity 
(cases 3 and 7) because of low switching costs or exit
barriers.  If task programmability is low, a relational
contract that fosters a cooperative attitude is required
because output and behavioral controls are ineffective.
High task programmability suggests an “inside con-
tract” system, in which departments are paid piece-rate
and a manager is needed to monitor behavior.
Contractual problems arise when there is high
nonseparability and high asset specificity (cases 4 and
8).  If task programmability is high, vertical integration
(hierarchy) is the most effective organizational struc-
ture. Low task programmability leads to what Mahoney
calls the worst-case scenario, in which asset specificity
is high and both input and output measurements are
ineffective.  The prescribed organizational structure is
a “clan” relationship, in which individuals are not
rewarded on the basis of performance and opportunistic
behavior is replaced by an emphasis on organizational
goals.
Jeffrey S. Royer, 402-472-4634
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